Stephen darwall second person standpoint

images stephen darwall second person standpoint

I suspect that the ease of getting through the text will be proportional to your knowledge of those two authors' ideas specifically. But even if we follow Darwall in supposing that such attitudes cannot be justified by appeal to "non-second-personal" considerations, we can still demand some account of how it can belong to a sound condition of the faculty of practical reason that I, who after all am not the same agent as you, should nevertheless not merely take your reactions into account, but should submit myself to the standard of what you could deem to be reasonable. Darwall answers: Nearly everything. Stephen L. Instead, the sergeant aims to immediately direct the private's will; he purports to "address a second-personal practical reason" to the private.

  • The SecondPerson Standpoint in Law and Morality a workshop with Stephen Darwall PhilEvents
  • Stephen Darwall, Respect and the SecondPerson Standpoint PhilPapers
  • The SecondPerson Standpoint Morality, Respect, and Accountability by Stephen L. Darwall
  • Stephen Darwall, Respect and the SecondPerson Standpoint PhilPapers

  • Stephen Darwall's earlier work has contributed much to the resurgence of systematic moral philosophy in the Kantian tradition. Yet here in this. Morality, Respect, and Accountability. The inability of philosophy to answer this question in a compelling manner—along with the moral skepticism and ethical confusion that ensue—result, Stephen Darwall argues, from our failure to appreciate the essentially interpersonal.

    : The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability (): Stephen Darwall: Books.
    What would be the mistake in that? There are lots of things in the historical literature that take circuitous courses around major points in the arguments when it could be argued much more directly, and the result is that some of the arguments aren't really that compelling when they probably could've been if he approached them differently.

    The SecondPerson Standpoint in Law and Morality a workshop with Stephen Darwall PhilEvents

    Returning to the main line of argument: even if you and Darwall, and many others too, present and accept second-personal reasons, and are caught-up in all that comes in tow, what does that have to do with me?

    Thus it seems that "we" does refer to a genuinely plural subject, one which is a possible subject of action, and indeed a possible occupant of the second-person standpoint: perhaps we promise you to stop playing patty-cake, if you will bring us some chocolate cake. These concepts -- valid demand, practical authority, second-personal reason and accountability to -- constitute an "interdefinable" and "irreducible" circle of second-personal concepts, according to Darwall.

    If you have no knowledge of them whatsoever, I think but am not certain that the text could be largely incomprehensible A lot more can be said here, but not by me.

    Stephen Darwall, Respect and the SecondPerson Standpoint PhilPapers

    Anyone working on these topics or their history will want to investigate this very ambitious, imaginative and wide-ranging book.

    images stephen darwall second person standpoint
    RAIDER 150 MODIFIED RED ACTIVA
    More filters.

    Mar 18, Matthew Reade rated it liked it.

    Video: Stephen darwall second person standpoint The Second Person Standpoint Morality, Respect, and Accountability

    If I were editing the book, this would've been my major suggestion for adjusting it. But does the idea of a solitary second-personal demand make sense? It demands compliance with "principles that are acceptable, or not reasonably rejectable, to each as free and rational agents … apt for second-personal address" In addressing a demand I purport to give you a second-personal reason, and thus presuppose that I have the authority to hold you accountable.

    RESPECT AND THE SECOND-PERSON.

    STANDPOINT. STEPHEN DARWALL. UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN. I'd like to rethink with you the nature of respect for. “MORALITY FROM THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT”. An Interview with STEPHEN DARWALL by Darlei Dall'Agnol ethic@:Would you please introduce. Stephen Darwall, the Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect and Accountability (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, ).
    More Details A "how possible?

    But even if we follow Darwall in supposing that such attitudes cannot be justified by appeal to "non-second-personal" considerations, we can still demand some account of how it can belong to a sound condition of the faculty of practical reason that I, who after all am not the same agent as you, should nevertheless not merely take your reactions into account, but should submit myself to the standard of what you could deem to be reasonable.

    I suspect that the ease of getting through the text will be proportional to your knowledge of those two authors' ideas specifically.

    The SecondPerson Standpoint Morality, Respect, and Accountability by Stephen L. Darwall

    Let's just start with something, promissory obligation. Chris Gallagher rated it it was amazing Jan 31,

    images stephen darwall second person standpoint
    Stephen darwall second person standpoint
    The determinate content of these principles would be given through a "hypothetical, idealized process of agreement that situates the parties as equal persons"though Darwall does not say much about this: his interest is primarily in the structure and foundation of morality, not the elaboration of its content.

    It demands compliance with "principles that are acceptable, or not reasonably rejectable, to each as free and rational agents … apt for second-personal address" And so one wants to know what, if anything, can vindicate the unconditional demands of the specifically moral sphere of life-in-the-second-person. And so, according to morality as equal accountabilitywhat one is morally obligated to do is ultimately what one demands of oneself as a member of a community of persons all of whom are equally in a position to make such demands of themselves and of others, and to recognize their membership in such a community of persons.

    Moreover, Darwall is equally doubtful of a more modest Kantian attempt to characterize what it is to be a rational agent who recognizes that it is subject to categorical 'oughts' whose validity is a posit which individual practical reason cannot prove to itself -- think second Critique and "fact of reason".

    Yet here in this new book Darwall turns against his Kantian roots, insisting on the impossibility of either finding or establishing the moral law in the bare idea of rational agency.

    But even if we follow Darwall in supposing that such attitudes cannot be justified by appeal to "non-second-personal" considerations, we can still demand some account of how it can belong to a sound condition of the faculty of practical reason that I, who after all am not the same agent as you, should nevertheless not merely take your reactions into account, but should submit myself to the standard of what you could deem to be reasonable.

    PDF | On Jan 1,Stephen Darwall and others published The Second- Person Standpoint.

    Symposium on Stephen Darwall's Second-Person Standpoint and the Law, Loyola is due to a line of thought developed by Stephen Darwall. Comment on Stephen Darwall's The Second Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect and Accountability.

    Stephen Darwall, Respect and the SecondPerson Standpoint PhilPapers

    GIDEON YAFFE. University of Southern.
    Here is Darwall: "Call the second-person standpoint the perspective you and I take up when we make and acknowledge claims on one another's conduct and will" 3. Being under a moral obligation just is being morally accountable to another: "To understand moral obligation … we have to see it as involving demands that are 'in force' from the moral point of view, that is, from the first-person plural perspective of the moral community" 9.

    If the sergeant does have the relevant practical authoritythe private has a second-personal reason to do the push-ups.

    Stephen L. Wenwen Fan rated it it was amazing Aug 16, But if the moral community is not the same form of community as either the snowstorm community or the patty-cake community, then what form of community or "we" is it?

    images stephen darwall second person standpoint

    Such an agent is conceivable and possible, Darwall insists, yet would not be autonomous in Kant's sense: the power to act is not itself a substantive principle of action.

    images stephen darwall second person standpoint
    GLIWICE RYBNIK PKS CENA
    Moreover, it would also seem that I can make a demand as a member of, or from the perspective of, this patty-cake community: I hold you accountable through blame when you do not fulfill your end of the bargain.

    Published by Harvard University Press first published November 6th 9. Thus it seems that "we" does refer to a genuinely plural subject, one which is a possible subject of action, and indeed a possible occupant of the second-person standpoint: perhaps we promise you to stop playing patty-cake, if you will bring us some chocolate cake. There are lots of things in the historical literature that take circuitous courses around major points in the arguments when it could be argued much more directly, and the result is that some of the arguments aren't really that compelling when they probably could've been if he approached them differently.

    images stephen darwall second person standpoint

    Kyle Adams rated it it was ok Jan 23, These concepts -- valid demand, practical authority, second-personal reason and accountability to -- constitute an "interdefinable" and "irreducible" circle of second-personal concepts, according to Darwall.

    In closing, I would like to take a step back from the details of Darwall's discussion to raise a question about the big picture.

    3 Replies to “Stephen darwall second person standpoint”
    1. If the demand is valid, the private is accountable to the sergeant for compliance: the private would not merely make a mistake in failing to comply but would in some sense wrong the sergeant. And occupying the second-person standpoint just is being in the distinctive normative space shaped by these concepts, the space of second-personal reasons.

    2. Make no mistake, this was a massive pain for me to read It's an ethics book. In addressing a demand I purport to give you a second-personal reason, and thus presuppose that I have the authority to hold you accountable.

    3. Very repetitious and a bit haphazard in its approach, but this book does put forward a substantial contribution to contemporary contractualist theory. The second step of the main argument is meant to answer these questions and thereby to deliver Darwall's particular specification or conception of morality.